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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
CASE NO. 20070068-CA
Plaintiff/Appellee,
vs.
RORY DEMBERT,
Defendant/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

JURISDICTION
Appellant, RORY DEMBERT (“Mr. Dembert”), appeals from the denial of
his motion to suppress evidence and the consequent Judgment, Sentence, and
Order for Commitment. This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-2a-3.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
ISSUE 1: Was Mr. Dembert denied his constitutional right to effective
assistance of counsel when his trial counsel did not file a motion to suppress
incriminating statements at least five days prior to trial?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: When a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel is raised for the first time on appeal, this Court resolves the issue as a
matter of law. State v. Mahi, 125 P.3d 103, 105 (Utah App. 2005).

ISSUE 2: Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Dembert’s
motion to suppress evidence on the ground that it was untimely under Rule 12(c)
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The trial court’s denial of Mr. Dembert’s
motion to suppress on procedural grounds is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
State v. Cornejo, 138 P.3d 97, 100 (Utah App. 2006).
ISSUE 3: Did the trial court err in denying Mr. Dembert’s motion to
suppress allegedly incriminating statements that were made when law enforcement
continued to question him after he invoked his right to remain silent under
Miranda?
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The denial of a motion to suppress evidence
is reviewed for correctness, giving no deference to the trial court. State v. Adams,
2007 UT App 117, ¶7.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 18, 2006, Mr. Dembert was charged with one count of Aggravated
Assault, a second degree felony. R:1-6. A preliminary hearing was conducted on
August 22, 2006, after which the charge was bound over for trial. R:31-32. On
November 21, 2006, which was also the first day of Mr. Dembert’s jury trial, Mr.
Dembert’s counsel filed a motion to suppress allegedly incriminating statements
(Addendum A) that were made during the initial investigation after Mr. Dembert
invoked his right to remain silent and requested the assistance of an attorney.
R100-101. The trial court denied the motion on the ground that it was untimely
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under Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and also denied the
motion on its merits. R170:13-14. A jury convicted Mr. Dembert of the charge on
November 22, 2006. R171:28. On December 15, 2006, Mr. Dembert was
sentenced to serve 1-15 years at the Utah State Prison. R147-48. Mr. Dembert
timely filed his Notice of Appeal on January 3, 2007. R157-58.
While this case has been pending in this Court, the parties stipulated to
supplement the record with a certified transcript of Mr. Dembert’s interview with
police that was admitted into evidence. After this Court signed the order, the
district court apparently did not respond for several weeks. The Clerk of this
Court then notified Mr. Dembert’s counsel it had been discovered the district court
did not have the DVD in the record. Counsel for Mr. Dembert then requested the
DVD from the Salt Lake District Attorney’s Office pursuant to a specific request
for discovery. It was provided and a certified transcript was ordered.
However, it subsequently became apparent to counsel for the State that the
transcript included portions of the interview that had not been admitted into
evidence during Mr. Dembert’s trial. The parties eventually reached a second
Stipulation as to what occurred during that interview. A copy of that Stipulation,
which has been filed with this Court, is attached hereto as Addemdum B.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 16, 2006 at about 1:00 a.m., Angelo Pollock (Mr. Pollock) was
stabbed several times by Mr. Dembert outside of the Road Home homeless shelter
located at 210 South Rio Grande Street in Salt Lake City. R:170:27. Mr. Pollock
4

testified Mr. Dembert was trying to steal Mr. Pollock’s cocaine when Mr. Dembert
attacked him with a knife. R170:22-29. Mr. Pollock said he also had a knife that
he claimed he was using to open a bottle of wine when Mr. Dembert approached
him from behind. R170:25. After being stabbed in the abdomen, shoulder, and
buttocks, Mr. Pollock testified he “finally told [Mr. Dembert], ‘I’m done.’” Mr.
Dembert responded, “I know you are,” and left the scene. R170:53, 55.
Gail Cameron was working at the Road Home at the time of the stabbing.
R170:61-62. Ms. Cameron has a monitor at her desk linked to an outside camera.
R170:63. At the time of the incident, Ms. Cameron was not watching the monitor
because she was helping someone at her desk. R170:63, 71-72. Therefore, Ms.
Cameron did not see how the fight started. R170:72. When she did look at the
monitor she saw a man fall to the ground, so she “focused the camera in on it.”
R170:63. Ms. Cameron testified she then saw Mr. Pollock “on his back, with his
hands and his feet in the air, as though he was trying to defend himself.” R170:64.
She testified Mr. Pollock was not holding a knife. R170:64, 75. She then
observed Mr. Dembert lean over and strike Mr. Pollock, and “when [Mr. Dembert]
stood up [she] saw a knife in his hand.” R170:66.
Both Mr. Pollock and Mr. Dembert are drug addicts and both had used
cocaine around the time of the incident. R170:22, 39, 49. Mr. Pollock had
“smoked some earlier” and was “in the midst of smoking it” when the incident
occurred. R170:39-40. Mr. Pollock testified while he could recall the events of
July 16, 2006, he had no recollection of testifying at the preliminary hearing
5

conducted on August 22, 2006. R170:37-38, 41, 57-58. Mr. Pollock also testified
he had a prior conviction for providing false information to a peace officer,
although he lied about that conviction at the preliminary hearing. R170:41-42.
Officer Michael Blackburn of the Salt Lake City Police Department was
only a couple of blocks away from the incident when he was contacted by dispatch
to respond to the scene. R170:77. Mr. Dembert was almost directly across the
street from the shelter where the incident occurred, “sitting next to the east fence,
kind of crouched down like in a sitting position with a bag in front of him, wearing
a black shirt and white pants.” R 170:79, 85. Mr. Dembert appeared “really
nervous, real apprehensive to make eye contact. … [He was] real timid and shy,
more head down, fidgeting with something in a green backpack or a green bag he
had in front of him.” R170:79. Mr. Dembert made no attempt to flee the scene
and he followed the officers’ instructions. R170:87.
When Officer Blackburn asked Mr. Dembert if he had seen “anything that
went on,” Officer Blackburn testified he could not recall whether Mr. Dembert
responded to the question. R170:81. Because Mr. Dembert matched the
description of the suspect, officers conducted a pat-down search, took his wallet to
identify him, then handcuffed him and placed him inside a police vehicle.
R170:82. No weapons were found on Mr. Dembert’s person. R170:93.
Officer Kevin Ford of the Salt Lake City Police Department was working
with Officer Blackburn when the dispatch call came in. R170:90. He testified
knives were found in Mr. Dembert’s green duffle bag. R170:92. When Officers
6

Blackburn and Ford placed Mr. Dembert under arrest, Officer Ford looked into
Mr. Dembert’s bag and “could see the blade of a knife poking up with blood
running down it.” R170:94.
Officer Ford testified he booked into evidence another knife presumably
belonging to Mr. Pollock that was located at the crime scene after the scene was
secured. R170:99.
It appears Officer Angeline Portel of the Salt Lake City Police Department
was the first officer to respond to the scene. R170:101-2. She obtained Mr.
Dembert’s description from Gail Cameron who was assisting Mr. Pollock and
provided that information to Officers Blackburn and Ford. R170:104. Officer
Portel also identified a photograph of Mr. Pollock’s knife that was found at the
crime scene. R170:110. After Mr. Dembert was transported to the police station,
Officer Portel interviewed him. R170:105. The jury was shown a portion of that
interview. R170:106-7.
Scott Scriven was a crime lab technician for the Salt Lake City Police
Department. R170:113. He took several photographs of the crime scene including
a knife presumably belonging to Mr. Pollock that was found on the sidewalk at the
scene. R170:116.
Mr. Dembert testified in his own defense. R170:117. He had been living
in the area of the shelter for three or four days prior to the stabbing, sleeping on
the sidewalk. R170:118. He testified he kept all of his worldly possessions,
comprised of a couple of knives and some personal items, in his duffle bag.
7

R170:118. He testified he kept the knives for protection. R170:119. Mr. Dembert
further testified that on the night of the stabbing, Mr. Pollock and two or three
other men approached him and accused him of stealing their drugs. R170:119-20.
Mr. Pollock and the men he was with were also speaking Spanish with each other.
Id. It was after midnight and it was dark. R170:119. Mr. Dembert denied stealing
any drugs. R170:120. Mr. Dembert then moved to another area and sat on a
bench located at the front of the shelter where there were more people and
surveillance cameras, hoping Mr. Pollock and the men with him “might not mess
with me if I was sitting [there.]” R170:121.
However, Mr. Pollock then joined Mr. Dembert on the bench and continued
to accuse him of taking Mr. Pollock’s drugs, which accusation Mr. Dembert
continued to deny. R170:121. Mr. Dembert testified he was trying to go to sleep
on his bag. R170:122. Mr. Pollock and the men with him “were standing all
around me, you know, and speaking in Spanish. I was kind of nervous; and when
I look (sic) up, [Mr. Pollock] had a knife. … and was coming towards me with a
knife.” R170:122-23. Mr. Dembert testified Mr. Pollock was holding the knife by
the handle and swinging the blade toward Mr. Dembert. R170:123. Mr. Dembert
then reached in his bag and grabbed one of his knives. Id. Mr. Dembert testified
he and Mr. Pollock then started fighting. Id.
Mr. Dembert testified Mr. Pollock was “swinging wild” and Mr. Pollock’s
knife came “[r]eal close” to his body. R170:124. Mr. Dembert started swinging at
Mr. Pollock while Mr. Pollock was “[t]rying to stick” Mr. Dembert. They “both
8

kind of stood up … and [Mr. Pollock] swung and he kind of got off balance and …
he fell on the ground and throwed (sic) his hands up, saying, ‘I’m done, I’m
done.’” R170:124. Mr. Dembert then testified, “I seen the knife, and I seen he
had nothing in his hands, so I quit.” R170:124-25. At that point Mr. Dembert
walked across the street. R170:126.
Mr. Dembert testified he did not realize he had stabbed Mr. Pollock until
the police told him there was blood on Mr. Dembert’s knife. R170:125. He
testified, “it’s kind of blurry because I had been up two days. We both were
getting high, you know. We were both high. We were on drugs, and it’s kind of
hard to say exactly; but once he come at me, he swung his knife, you know, I
jumped and twist and just hanging on to each other.” R170:125. Mr. Dembert
testified, “I was just trying to keep him up off me.” Id.
When the police arrived almost immediately after the incident Mr. Dembert
was cooperative. R170:127. After the police transported Mr. Dembert to the
police station, he testified he told them he did not want to talk to them without his
lawyer present. Id. Mr. Dembert said he told the police the fight started because
of a misunderstanding over the drugs. Id. What Mr. Dembert meant by that
statement was the fight started because Mr. Pollock accused him of stealing his
drugs, and Mr. Dembert referred to the nature of that dispute as “stupid.”
R170:128. Mr. Dembert testified he felt partly responsible for the
misunderstanding because “I told the dude where the drugs was (sic), and he went
and got it. That’s what started … the altercation about the drugs, you know.
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Basically … because I did that, I felt like … I kind of created the situation. You
know, it don’t justify him coming at me with a knife, though …” R170:128.
On cross-examination, Mr. Dembert denied stabbing Mr. Pollock after he
had fallen to the ground. R170:131. However, he did acknowledge he had been
awake for several hours and was using cocaine such that his memory and
perception of the events were not as sharp as they would have been otherwise.
R170:131. Mr. Dembert testified, “ Well, we both was [swinging wildly], you
know, and I didn’t even know – like I say, I didn’t even know if I was hit, I didn’t
even know if he was hit. I didn’t – like when he fell and throwed (sic) his hands
up, I just backed off and went across the street.” R170:132.
Stipulation: Police Interview with Mr. Dembert
A portion of the videotaped police interview was played for the jury and the
prosecution summed up that relevant portion during closing argument:
The defendant’s arrested; and then he’s taken to the police station and
interviewed by Officer Portel. You saw that interview that she had with the
defendant. She asked him several times, you know, what happened, what
was going on. He says a few things. He says that it was a mistake, “I made
a mistake. It was something stupid.” Then he says it wasn’t him – well,
she asked him again, you know, “What happened?” He says, “It wasn’t
him; it was me. It was a drug thing. I got caught up in a drug thing. I use
drugs. My mind goes whoosh.”
That’s what happened. He was using drugs. He wanted some more. Mr.
Pollock didn’t want to share with him, and so whoosh, he snapped and
stabbed … Mr. Pollock.
R171:6. Thus taken out of context Mr. Dembert’s statements were incriminating
and the prosecution presented Mr. Dembert’s statements as a confession of guilt.
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The alleged incriminating statements were elicited after Mr. Dembert
invoked his right to not incriminate himself. At the commencement of the
interview and immediately after Mr. Dembert was read his Miranda rights, he
refused to sign the waiver form and unequivocally invoked his right to not
incriminate himself silent. The parties have stipulated to the following facts:
1. Following his arrest, Defendant was questioned by Officer Portel and
Lt. Smith in an interview room at the Salt Lake City police station.
2. Before interrogating Defendant, Officer Portel placed a Miranda waiver
form on the table in front of Defendant and advised him of his Miranda
rights. The following exchange between Officer Portel and Defendant
then took place:
Officer Portel: Do you understand these rights?
Defendant: Yes. I’m being charged?
Officer Portel: Um, yes, you are under arrest.
Defendant: For what?
Officer Portel: For aggravated assault.
Officer Portel: Now, if you would like to tell me your side of the story,
because, like I said, I’m kind of missing some of the information I think,
uh, I need you to sign this form saying that you, you do want to talk to me,
you, you do want to have this conversation right now.
Defendant: I don’t have to?
Officer Portel: No, you don’t have to.
11

Defendant: I won’t (shaking head).
Officer Portel: You’re not going to sign it?
Defendant: Huh-uh (shaking head).
Officer Portel: So, you don’t want to answer any questions right now?
Defendant: Huh-uh (shaking head).
3. Officer Portel then folded the unsigned waiver form and put it away in
her notebook. While putting her pen back into her front pocket, Officer
Portel told Defendant that she did need to verify his name and she asked
Defendant for identification.
4. While Officer Portel was inquiring about Defendant’s identification, Lt.
Smith opened the door and asked to speak with her. Officer Portel
exited, leaving Defendant alone in the room.
5. Less than a minute later, Lt. Smith and Officer Portel re-entered the
room. Lt. Smith explained to Defendant that he was “possibly
responsible” for a crime that sent a man to the hospital, but that they
“don’t have … the whole story.” Lt. Smith asked Defendant whether he
had been read his Miranda rights and whether he understood them.
Defendant responded in the affirmative to both questions.
6. Lt. Smith then told Defendant that although he was under arrest and not
free to go, it did not mean that he was guilty. He told Defendant that
police had “an indication” Defendant “might be responsible” for the
crime, but that they “don’t know the other side of the story.” He told
12

Defendant that this was his opportunity to tell police his side of the
story and “get it out there on public record,” if he wished to do so. He
also told Defendant that he was not required to speak with police.
7. Lt. Smith then requested the Miranda waiver form from Officer Portel,
read Defendant his rights, and obtained Defendant’s waiver of those
rights. See SE19.
***
Based on the foregoing stipulated facts, the parties further stipulate as
follows:
8. After Officer Portel read Defendant his Miranda rights and confirmed
that he was not required to sign the waiver, Defendant unequivocally
responded that he did not want to waive his rights and speak with
police.
STIPULATION (Addendum B) (the original document skips paragraph numbers 4
and 7 but is otherwise identical to the foregoing).
Additional facts will be cited throughout the body of Appellant’s Brief as
warranted.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Mr. Dembert’s trial counsel rendered deficient performance that prejudiced
him when counsel filed the motion to suppress on the day of trial. The motion was
meritorious as Mr. Dembert “unequivocally” (Stipulation, Addendum B) invoked
his right to remain silent at the beginning of his interview with police, yet they
13

continued to question him. Had counsel timely filed the motion to suppress, the
alleged incriminating statements Mr. Dembert made would have been suppressed.
The failure to suppress those statements prejudiced Mr. Dembert because the
State’s primary witness was the alleged victim who was less credible than Mr.
Dembert was.
The trial court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Dembert’s motion
to suppress his alleged involuntary “confession” on procedural grounds. The
notice purpose of Rule 12(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure was met on
these facts because the State was prepared to argue the merits of the motion. So
the rule requiring the defense to file a motion to suppress five days prior to trial
did not apply. Also, the nature of the constitutional rights that were violated when
the incriminating statements were elicited and the prejudice created by their
admission far outweighed the procedural requirement. Further, the trial court’s
subsequent consideration of the motion on its merits constituted a waiver of the
rule’s requirements. Finally, under the controlling federal law, a procedural rule
cannot circumvent the requirement that an involuntary confession be suppressed.
The trial court also erred when it alternatively denied Mr. Dembert’s
motion to suppress on its merits. It is undisputed Mr. Dembert unequivocally
invoked his right to remain silent, yet the officers continued to question him in
violation of his right to not incriminate himself.

14

ARGUMENT
I. TRIAL COUNSEL’S PERFORMANCE WAS BOTH DEFICIENT
AND PREJUDICIAL.
Mr. Dembert’s counsel was ineffective for not timely filing the motion to
suppress statements made during his interview with police. Further, Mr. Dembert
was prejudiced by that ineffective assistance.
Both federal and State courts recognize a defendant’s Sixth Amendment
right to effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668
(1984) is the seminal case adopted by Utah courts which established the twopronged test for determining whether the right to counsel is violated: (1) whether
counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2)
whether the defendant was prejudiced by the objectively deficient performance,
i.e., there is a reasonable probability that but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the results would have been different. See also, Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362
(2000) (reiterating the reasonable probability standard to establish prejudice).
If this Court affirms the district court’s ruling by concluding Mr. Dembert’s
motion was untimely filed and was properly dismissed on procedural grounds, that
holding will establish trial counsel’s objectively deficient performance. In that
event, the only question for this Court is whether Mr. Dembert was prejudiced by
his counsel’s objectively deficient performance. Because it is true that but for trial
counsel’s unprofessional error in untimely filing the motion to suppress the motion
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would have been granted such that statements portrayed as incriminating would
have been suppressed, prejudice is established.
The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States provides,
“No person … shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.” U.S. Const. Amend. V. A defendant who is both in custody and subject
to interrogation is in an “inherently coercive” environment. New York v. Quarles,
467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984). To protect a defendant against this inherently coercive
environment, law enforcement officers are required to convey the warnings set
forth in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) in such a manner that they
apprise “accused persons of their right of silence and [assure] a continuous
opportunity to exercise it.” Id. at 467.
When a motion to suppress is filed on the basis of a Miranda violation, the
prosecution must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently waived his rights. Id. at 475. The
prosecution must show that the waiver was an uncoerced choice and that the
defendant understood both the nature of the rights he was waiving and the
consequences of the waiver. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). The
prosecution could not have met this burden in this case because Mr. Dembert
“unequivocally” invoked his right to remain silent before any statements were
made. Stipulation at ¶10.
Courts apply a totality of circumstances test to determine if a waiver of
Miranda rights is valid. Id. Relevant factors to apply in making that
16

determination include the defendant’s intelligence and education,1 his experience
with the criminal justice system, 2 and his physical and mental condition.3 More
important, once a defendant has invoked his right to remain silent, law
enforcement are required to cease all questioning. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74;
see also, United States v. Tyler, 164 F.3d 150, 154-55 (3d Cir. 1998) (continued
questioning after defendant stated he did not want to talk violated Miranda even
though officers repeated the warnings); McGraw v. Holland, 257 F.3d 513, 515
(6th Cir. 2001) (officers violated Miranda when they continued questioning after
defendant said he did not want to talk about the crime); United States v. Rambo,
365 F.3d 906, 910-11 (10th Cir. 2004) (same).
The police did not cease questioning Mr. Dembert when he “unequivocally
responded that he did not want to waive his rights and speak with police.”
Stipulation at ¶10. Yet once a defendant invokes his right to remain silent, further
interrogation is impermissible unless the defendant initiates more discussion. See,

1

See, e.g., Henry v. Dees, 658 F.2d 406, 411 (5th Cir. 1981) (waiver by mentally
handicapped defendant was invalid because his inability to understand the waiver
and its consequences were demonstrated by the record and police failed to take
extra precautions).

2

See, e.g., Smith v. Mullin, 379 F.3d 919, 933 (10th Cir. 2004) (waiver was valid in
part because defendant had prior experience with the criminal justice system); but
see, United States v. Longbehn, 850 F.2d 450, 453 (8th Cir. 1988) (suspect’s
knowledge of rights does not obviate requirement to give Miranda warnings even
when suspect is a police officer).
3

Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 399-400 (1978) (waiver not valid where
defendant was in the hospital and repeatedly requested the presence of counsel
while complaining to be in terrible pain).
17

Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46 (1983) (plurality opinion)
(emphasizing that initiation of conversation and waiver of Fifth Amendment rights
are two separate inquiries); see also, United States v. Szymaniak, 934 F.3d 434,
439 (2d Cir. 1991) (it was impermissible for officers to approach defendant and
ask if he wanted to talk after he invoked his rights).
Mr. Dembert did not initiate more discussion after he invoked his right to
remain silent, yet the police continued to interrogate him. Stipulation at ¶¶2-3, 6,
8. Therefore, the officers’ refusal to cease questioning in this case was a clear
violation of Mr. Dembert’s right to not incriminate himself and his motion to
suppress should and would have been granted if it had been filed timely.
Further, the unlawful admission of Mr. Dembert’s incriminating statements
at trial prejudiced him such that it is likely the jury would have acquitted him if
those statements had been suppressed. The portion of the police interview that
was admitted into evidence was presented to the jury as a confession. The
prosecutor paraphrased Mr. Dembert’s statements as, “I made a mistake. It was
something stupid. …” “It wasn’t him; it was me. It was a drug thing. I got caught
up in a drug thing. I use drugs. My mind goes whoosh.” R171:6.
The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that juries usually give confessions
great weight so their admission usually cannot be construed as harmless error.
Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296, 306-12 (1991). In other words,
prejudice should be presumed in this case unless the State can establish the error
was harmless. The State cannot do so on these facts.
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Mr. Dembert’s alleged “confession” in this case likely carried even greater
weight in light of both Mr. Dembert’s and Mr. Pollock’s serious credibility issues
and their conflicting stories of self-defense. The only other eyewitness to the
altercation was Gail Cameron who saw only the last portion of the fight on her
desk monitor. R170:63. Ms. Cameron testified she was not watching the monitor
when the fight started, so she did not see who initiated the attack. R170:72. She
saw Mr. Pollock fall to the ground and assume a defensive position after he had
been stabbed, then saw Mr. Dembert lean over and strike Mr. Pollock briefly.
R170:64, 75. She testified Mr. Pollock was not holding a knife, but Mr. Dembert
did have a knife in his hand. R170:64, 66, 75.
This evidence is consistent with Mr. Dembert’s claim that Mr. Pollock
attacked him first such that Mr. Dembert was forced to defend himself. Further,
Officer Ford testified he booked into evidence another knife that was found at the
crime scene and was not the knife Mr. Dembert had used. R170:99 (see also,
R170:94 where Officer Ford testified he found a knife in Mr. Dembert’s bag that
had blood on it).
Mr. Pollock, who admitted to smoking cocaine at the time of the incident,
testified he was using his knife to open a bottle of wine when Mr. Dembert
approached him from behind. R170:22-29, 25, 39, 49. Yet Mr. Pollock had no
memory of testifying at the preliminary hearing and had a prior conviction for
providing false information to a peace officer, which he lied about at the
preliminary hearing. R170:37-8, 41-2, 57-8.
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While neither Mr. Pollock nor Mr. Dembert was particularly credible, Mr.
Pollock was the lesser of the two because he had no memory of the preliminary
hearing, he perjured himself at the preliminary hearing, and had a prior conviction
for lying to a peace officer. Without seeing who initiated the attack, it was
impossible for Ms. Cameron to know who started it. This poor evidence falls far
short of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. In this context, the alleged confession
was absolutely critical. Therefore, without Mr. Dembert’s incriminating
statements, there is a reasonable probability the jury would have acquitted him.
Mr. Dembert was prejudiced by his trial counsel’s ineffective assistance
and thereby denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel because there is a
reasonable likelihood the outcome of trial would have been in his favor had his
motion to suppress been granted. Accordingly, his conviction should be vacated
and this matter remanded for a new trial.
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING MR. DEMBERT’S
MOTION TO SUPPRESS ON THE MERITS AND FOR BEING
UNTIMELY.
An involuntary confession is not admissible at trial. Chavez v. Martinez,
538 U.S. 760, 770 (2003). Although the admission of a coerced confession may
be construed as harmless, this is a difficult to establish because confessions are
usually given great weight. See, Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296, 30612 (1991) (“[A]n involuntary confession may have a more dramatic effect on the
course of trial than do other trial errors … but this simply means that a reviewing
court will conclude in such a case that its admission was not harmless error.”).
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Before a trial court can rule on a motion to suppress incriminating
statements and before the prosecution can introduce that evidence at trial, the court
is required to conduct a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine
voluntariness of the defendant’s statements. Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 53444 (1967). If a motion to suppress is denied, a finding that the defendant’s
statements were voluntary must be clearly reflected in the record. Id. at 544.
A. The trial court erred when it denied Mr. Dembert’s motion on
procedural grounds under Rule 12 (c).
In this case, the fact that Mr. Dembert was both in custody and subject to
interrogation cannot be disputed and is not at issue. He had been placed under
arrest and was subject to questioning at the police station. R172:6. At the
commencement of the interrogation and immediately after being informed of his
Miranda rights, Mr. Dembert unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent.
When he was presented with the waiver form, he asked if he had to sign it and
when informed he did not have to, he refused to sign it and further refused to
answer any questions. R170:8; Addendum B. Notwithstanding Mr. Dembert’s
unequivocal response that he did not want to waive his rights or talk to the police,
the officers continued questioning him. Id.
Mr. Dembert’s trial counsel did not file the motion to suppress until the day
of trial. R100-101. The State argued the motion should be denied because the
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure require a motion to suppress be brought five
days prior to trial. R170:10. The State further argued Mr. Dembert did eventually
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sign the Miranda waiver and the State presented a photocopy of that document to
the court. R170:10. The trial court denied the motion to suppress on the
procedural ground that the issue was waived for not bringing it timely under Rule
12(c) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. R170:13-14.
The trial court’s denial of Mr. Dembert’s motion on procedural grounds
was an abuse of discretion for four reasons: (1) because the State was prepared to
and in fact did argue the merits of the motion, the implicit notice requirement of
Rule 12(c) did not apply; (2) the nature of the substantial rights involved and the
potential for prejudice required the trial court to consider the issue on its merits;
(3) the trial court’s subsequent cursory denial of the motion purportedly on its
merits constituted a waiver of the requirements of the rule; and (4) the controlling
federal law prohibits the denial of a motion to suppress evidence on mere
procedural grounds.
While in a perfect world it might be ideal to resolve all evidentiary issues
prior to trial, prosecutors and defense counsel frequently make objections to
evidence on grounds of inadmissibility on the day of trial. The imposition of a
five-day deadline for filing a motion to suppress under Rule 12(c) is intended to
provide the State with sufficient notice of the issue being raised so it can be argued
and ruled upon at least on the day of trial. Moreover, under its plain language the
trial court has considerable discretion to waive the requirements of the rule.
While the prosecutor in this case objected to Mr. Dembert’s motion based
on timeliness grounds, the prosecutor also indicated to the court that he was
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prepared to argue the motion on its merits and he then proceeded to do so.
R170:10-13. The prosecution never claimed any prejudice caused by a lack of
notice. Rather, the prosecution merely objected to Mr. Dembert’s failure to
comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 12(c). The notice purpose of the
procedural requirement was not the basis for the State’s objection. Therefore, it
was an abuse of the trial court’s discretion to deny Mr. Dembert’s motion on the
ground that he had waived the issue.
Also, the potential for prejudice to the accused requires a court to consider
a motion to suppress an involuntary confession on its merits. In State v. Cornejo,
138 P.3d 97 (Utah App. 2006), the defense moved on the day of trial to suppress
the results of the defendant’s involuntary blood draw and the trial court ordered an
immediate evidentiary hearing on the issue. The State moved for a continuance of
the trial and the evidentiary hearing on the ground that the State had not
anticipated the defense’s objection to the blood draw evidence and thus had not
subpoenaed an essential witness because the defense had not filed a motion to
suppress at least five days prior to trial. The State argued that under these
circumstances the trial court’s denial of its motion for a continuance was an abuse
of discretion. This Court agreed with the State and reiterated that an abuse of
discretion occurs when the moving party is prejudiced, meaning their substantial
rights are adversely affected, such that there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable result for the moving party had their motion been granted. Id. at 101.
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In this case, had Mr. Dembert’s motion to suppress been granted, there is a
reasonable likelihood the outcome of trial would have been in his favor. This case
was one of “he said/he said.” Only Mr. Dembert and Mr. Pollock witnessed 4 the
entire encounter and both were admitted drug addicts who told two completely
inconsistent stories about the incident, with both claiming they acted in selfdefense.
However, Mr. Pollock was less credible than Mr. Dembert. Mr. Pollock
testified he had no recollection of testifying at the preliminary hearing and
admitted he had a prior conviction for providing false information to a peace
officer, which conviction he lied about when testifying under oath at the
preliminary hearing. R170: 37-38, 41-42, 57-58. Therefore, Mr. Dembert’s
seemingly incriminating statements from the police interrogation were particularly
weighty and damaging. Their admission cannot be construed as harmless on these
facts. Rather, they adversely affected Mr. Dembert’s substantial rights.
As previously noted, the trial court has considerable discretion under Rule
12 (c) to waive its requirements and consider the merits of a motion to suppress
and should do so when a contrary ruling will adversely affect the substantial rights
of the moving defendant. Further, a trial court’s consideration of such a motion on
its merits constitutes a waiver of the rule’s requirements. See, State v. Matsamas,

4

Gail Cameron, who worked at the shelter, testified she only saw Mr. Dembert
striking Mr. Pollock after Mr. Pollock had fallen to the ground and had assumed a
defensive stance. She did not see how the fight started or who instigated it.
R170:61-72.
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808 P.2d 1048 (Utah 1991) (holding trial court’s decision to not treat defendant’s
failure to raise issue prior to trial as a waiver and its decision to consider merits,
waived requirements of rule and preserved issue for appeal). Such discretion
simply highlights the fact that the procedural requirement is far less weighty than
the constitutional implications involved. The requirements of Rule 12(c) were
waived in this case when, “[f]or edification of the Counsel,” (R170:14), the trial
court did consider the merits of the defense’s motion to suppress. Id.
Finally, under the controlling federal law, evidence obtained in violation of
the Fifth Amendment may not be presented at trial for the purpose of proving the
defendant’s guilt. Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 205 (1960). As noted
herein, a trial court is required to conduct a hearing to determine whether a
confession was voluntary and to then make findings about the voluntariness of the
confession on the record. The trial court in this case refused to do so and denied
Mr. Dembert’s motion on procedural grounds.
Notwithstanding any state procedural rule such as Rule 12(c), the
admission of an involuntary confession is an error that requires reversal unless the
error was harmless. See, Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23-24 (1967).
Given the great weight juries give to purported confessions, the State’s burden to
establish harmless error is formidable and unlikely to be met, particularly on these
facts when the only two witnesses to the entire incident were Mr. Dembert and Mr.
Pollock, who both told widely divergent stories of their own asserted self-defense.
There is no authority under the federal law that allows a state, on merely
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procedural grounds, to force a defendant to waive his right to have an involuntary
confession suppressed. Therefore, to the extent Rule 12(c) allows for an
involuntary confession to be admitted at trial on procedural grounds, it is a
violation of the Supreme Court precedent cited herein and unconstitutional.
In this case, the trial court did deny Mr. Dembert’s motion to suppress on
the ground that it was brought untimely under Rule 12 (c). However, if in fact Mr.
Dembert’s “confession” was obtained in violation of the Fifth Amendment, the
exclusionary rule applies and trumps the procedural requirement. The rights at
issue far outweigh a mere procedural formality. See, Miranda v. Arizona, supra;
see also, United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984) (explaining the
exclusionary rule is not a personal constitutional right but rather a judicially
created remedy to deter the government from violating constitutional rights).
The Supreme Court has held that a trial court is required to conduct a
hearing on the merits outside the presence of the jury and to make a clear finding
on the record that the defendant’s statements were voluntary, which the trial court
did not do in this case. Sims v. Georgia, 385 U.S. 538, 534-44 (1967). Moreover,
the importance of the procedural requirement diminishes even further in light of
the fact that the prosecutor in this case was prepared to argue the motion on its
merits and did so, and the additional fact that the trial court found it would have
denied the motion on its merits in any event. R170:14.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court erred when it denied Mr. Dembert’s
motion to suppress under the procedural grounds set forth in Rule 12(c).
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B. The trial court erred when it denied Mr. Dembert’s motion to suppress
on its merits.
As previously indicated, the trial court did address the merits of Mr.
Dembert’s motion for “the edification of Counsel.” R170:14. Based on its review
of the transcript, the court determined that the communications that occurred
between the police and Mr. Dembert after he invoked his right to remain silent
were “in effort to clarify his rights under the Miranda warning. … and if he was
willing to sign the waiver.” Id. The court further noted that Mr. Dembert did sign
the waiver after he initially said he did not want to talk to the police. Id. The
court reiterated it was not denying the motion on its merits, but stated, “[I]f I were
addressing the merits, if it were me, here’s how I would have done it, I would rule
that the motion ought to be denied.” Id. This alternative denial of Mr. Dembert’s
motion on the merits was not supported by the facts or the law.
After Mr. Dembert unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent, Officer
Portel (who had been questioning him) left the interrogation room and
immediately returned with Officer C.T. Smith who resumed questioning. R170:89. Mr. Dembert did not initiate the discussion.
The officers’ actions in this case were a clear violation of Mr. Dembert’s
Fifth Amendment rights under the controlling law. When Mr. Dembert
unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent, the officers were required to
immediately cease all questioning. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74. However, they
continued to question him in a way that was carefully designed to elicit
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information, notwithstanding the officers’ acknowledgements that Mr. Dembert
did not have to answer their questions. Their continued questioning after Mr.
Dembert clearly invoked his right to remain silent violated Miranda. See, United
States v. Tyler, McGraw v. Holland, United States v. Rambo, supra.
While the informal transcript provided to the trial court is not part of the
record, the fact that Mr. Dembert unequivocally invoked his right to remain silent,
after which the officers continued to question him, was known to the trial court.
R170:8-9. Under the totality of these facts that were known to the trial court, Mr.
Dembert’s “confession” was not voluntary and the trial court erred in concluding
Mr. Dembert’s motion should also have been denied on its merits.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Dembert respectfully requests this Court to overturn the trial court’s
denial of his motion to suppress his statements and to remand this matter back to
the trial court for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this 22nd day of December, 2008.
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